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Introduction
Scientific realists hold that our best scientific theories are successful because the descriptions they offer of otherwise inaccessible domains of nature are at least probably and/or approximately true. Opponents of this commonsensical view have typically grounded their challenges either in arguments from the underdetermination of theories by the available evidence, or in the 'pessimistic induction' from the falsity of many past successful theories to the likely falsity of our own. In recent and forthcomin argued that the traditional arguments in supp the pessimistic induction leave much to be des determination from empirical equivalents succe distinctive concern about theoretical science fo apply equally well to any knowledge claim wh induction ignores important differences betw success enjoyed by past theories and those of o to reasonably resist the inductive projection f also argue that scientific realism faces a much m different sort of historical pattern. What shou suggest, is our repeated failure even to conceive theories that were nonetheless both well confi at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ult scientific community in the course of further Why does this problem of unconceived altern to scientific realism? In typical cases, the justif fundamental theory about the entities and dy some otherwise inaccessible domain of nature is abductive or eliminative in character: we arrive at a decision to believe or accept a given theory because we think it offers the best available explanation for the empirical evidence we have and because we regard rival or competing explanations of that same evidence as convincingly eliminated or discredited. But as Duhem eloquently noted long ago, such an abductive or eliminative inferential procedure will only guide us to the truth about nature if the truth is among the competing explanations or hypotheses we are considering in the first place:
Between two contradictory theorems of geometry there is no room for a third judgment; if one is false, the other is necessarily true. Do two hypotheses in physics ever constitute such a strict dilemma? Shall we ever dare to assert that no other hypothesis is imaginable? Light may be a swarm of projectiles, or it may be a vibratory motion whose waves are propagated in a medium; is it forbidden to be anything else at all? ([1954], pp. 189-90) What seems to have worried Duhem is the possibility that there might be equally well confirmed alternative hypotheses about the nature of light that we simply have not conceived of in the first place. Unconceived alternatives of this sort would indeed threaten the eliminative or abductive support we can offer for even the best of our own scientific theories, and I have suggested elsewhere that the historical record of scientific inquiry itself is the best source of evidence we have to use in deciding whether this is a serious challenge rather than a mere speculative possibility. Of course, a competing theory need not accommodate all of the evidence available at a given time to I choose this example in part because we might expect any positive evidence of the problem we can find in this particular case to be especially revealing.
For one thing, the staunch tradition of realism among both scientists and philosophers in the life sciences might naturally suggest that evidence of our historical vulnerability to the problem should be particularly difficult to come by in this arena. Furthermore, Darwin's theorizing about inheritance is at least broadly continuous with our own: pangenesis was first presented publicly in 1868, at a time when at least some influential theories of growth, development, and inheritance (traditionally regarded as aspects of the single subject of 'generation') had begun to be directed towards roughly the same is provided by Hodge ([1985] ; discussed in Bowler [1989] , p. 58; see also Endersby [2003] ; cf. Geison [1969] reports that 'my conviction is unshaken that it will hereafter be looked at as the best hypothesis of generation, inheritance [and] development.' And a later unpublished letter to J. V. Carus offers the similar view that 'after mature reflection I believe that physiologists will some day be compelled to admit some such doctrine' (October 19, 1868).10
Moreover, Darwin explicitly links his confidence that pangenesis will triumph or reappear with his inability to identify any alternative 9 I defer for the moment discussing the possibility that given the phenomena he took to exist, Darwin was right to think that (some version of) pangenesis alone could offer a convincing explanation for them. 10 My sincere thanks to the Cambridge University Library for providing me a reproduction of giving up the idea that shared peculiarities of parent and child are generally effects of a common-cause rather than links in a causal chain. That is, we might simply accept that the conditions in which the inheritance of acquired characters was supposed to occur were just those in which activities or events affecting the parent's body can exercise some influence on the shared germinal source of hereditary particles passed on to the offspring: we might even propose (as Francis Galton would later in connection with his own 'common-cause' alternative to pangenesis) a separate, gemmule-mediated 12 Such phenomena actually provide a nice illustration of one specific way in which the original pessimistic induction's willingness to project from past to present science is too simple, for much of the evidence of these phenomena for which Darwin was concerned to account was gathered from famous anecdotes (such as that of Lord Morton's chestnut mare; see [1905], v. ii, p. 446, [1903] , v. ii, p. 359), folk wisdom, the stories of animal breeders, and the like (see Olby [1985] , pp. 44 and 79, where the mare's owner is given as Lord Moreton), while the concerted efforts of more recent scientific methodology have undoubtedly established more stringent standards for the collection of data. But this difference does not mitigate the problem of unconceived alternatives, as Darwin was unable to exhaust the space of plausible explanations for the phenomena for which he thought a theory of generation needed to account. 13 A note of caution is in order here, however. As Winther documents ([2000] , pp. 436-9), Darwin felt increasingly forced to make room in his theory for a source of systematic, directed, nonrandom, or necessarily adaptive variation (including the inheritance of acquired characteristics) by the need to publicly accept Kelvin's estimate of the age of the Earth (which seemed to allow insufficient time for natural selection to produce present organismic diversity from a pool of purely random variation; see also Gayon [1998] We shall therefore take an approximately correct view of the origin of our life, if we consider our own embryos to have sprung immediately from those embryos whence our parents were developed, and these from the embryos of their parents, and so on forever. We should in this way look on the nature of mankind, and perhaps on that of the whole animated creation, as one continuous system, ever pushing out new branches in all directions, that variously interlace, and that bud into separate lives at every point of interlacement. (Galton [1865] , p. 322)
We should not, however, make the mistake of assuming simply becaus Balbiani (all the correspondence in this exchange can be found in Volume 16 Galton seeks to discharge this task in a remarkably dogmatic way, offering little in the w scientific argument or evidence and much in the way of generalities, assurances, and eug fantasies. Indeed, Cowan ([1985] , pp. 65-6) describes the 1865 article as 'a failure as a scien treatise' and 'an exercise in political rhetoric' in arguing that both Galton's interest in here and his commitments on contentious matters of fact were rooted in his eugenic ambition blending) heredity, we should not make the mistake of ceived alternatives by appealing to the widespread pre heredity was somehow the natural complement to Dar or the missing piece of a seamless puzzle and sugg embraced particulate heredity as the bride of natura As Bowler argues convincingly ([1989] , pp. 61-3), this Darwin's response to Fleeming Jenkin's famous arg evolution impossible (because characteristics that aros be swamped by blending in subsequent matings) and a ment to both the gradual character of the process of e saltational) character of the traits on which selection discussion, see also Gayon ([1998] , Ch. 3).
of possibilities both to one of Darwin's own contemporaries (Galton) and to immediately subsequent theorizing about inheritance and generation make it impossible to argue that it wasn't really a serious competitor even by the standards of his own day.
Conclusion
It is somewhat ironic (though not at all uncharacteristic) that Darwin adop ted such an apologetic and self-deprecating stance about his inability t understand Galton's account, for Darwin was anything but alone amon mid-19th century theorists in failing to grasp the fundamental structure of inheritance that Galton sought to propose. After all, the doctrine of the con tinuity of the germ plasm is most famously associated not with Galton bu with August Weismann: although Weismann would later acknowledge that
Galton had recognized the possibility of the continuity of the germ plasm, h was surely right to suggest that this idea had enjoyed virtually no attention and was of little significance for the scientific community at the tim (Robinson [1979] 
